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ABSTRACT 
The concept of an intermediary body (1MB) between government and universities 
has often been debated in the literature of higher education in Canada. While 
much of the discussion has centred around the theoretical advantages for both 
organizations which would accrue from the establishment of an 1MB, there have 
been few attempts to assess whether these advantages occur in practice. 
This paper reports on the result of a study of government - university relations 
in Alberta and British Columbia. The major purpose was to analyse differences in 
matters of autonomy, budget allocation, and planning, existing between Alberta, 
which abolished its 1MB in 1972, and British Columbia, which has had a 
Universities Council since 1974. 
The results indicated very few differences between the two provinces in the 
matters under review. What did emerge, however, were some important 
requirements for the effective operation of universities during the financial 
realities of the eighties. 
RÉSUMÉ 
L'on a souvent discuté dans la littérature couvrant l'éducation tertiaire au 
Canada la question d'une agence intermédiaire entre le gouvernement et les 
universités. La plupart de ces discussions traitent des avantages théoriques pour 
les deux groupes dérivant de Vétablissement d'une telle agence. Il y a eu, par 
contre, peu d'études faites sur la façon dont ces avantages se manifestent dans la 
pratique. 
Le présent article décrit une étude faite sur les relations entre le gouvernement 
et les universités en Alberta et en Colombie Britannique: il analyse les différences 
d'autonomie, d'allocation budgétaire, et de planning qui existent entre l'Alberta, 
où l'agence intermédiaire a été abolie en 1972, et la Colombie Britannique, où un 
Conseil des Universités existe depuis 1974. 
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Les résultats indiquent très peu de différence entre les deux provinces sur les 
questions couvertes par la présente enquête. Par contre, l'étude démontre qu'il 
existe d'importants critères nécessaires à l'opération efficace des universités pour 
faire face aux réalités financiaires des années quatre-vingt. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most controversial issues in the study of higher education in Canada 
during the past decade has been the nature of the relationship between government 
and universities. Since the publication of the Duff-Berdahl Report (1966) a variety 
of bureaucratic arrangements has developed in various provinces to facilitate 
matters such as the allocation of funds among institutions, program approval and 
the coordination of postsecondary institutions. 
Most provincial jurisdictions have created an "intermediary" or "buffer" agency 
interposed between government and the institutions, an organizational structure 
used in the United Kingdom and throughout the United States. Usually, the agency 
is in the form of a board, council or commission with either advisory or executive 
powers. A recent paper by Sibley (1982) outlined in some detail the nature, role 
and powers of the various provincial intermediary bodies in Canada (IMBs) and 
also discussed many of the concomitant issues which must be addressed by these 
agencies in the future. 
A question which was not raised in the Sibley paper, however, was whether the 
1MB has been of value to the universities, or the government, or both. In this 
context, "value" is generally interpreted as applying to such issues as the 
preservation of institutional autonomy, effective planning or responsiveness to 
specific needs, financial accountability, and the furtherance of public policy. 
Given the potential advantages of intermediary bodies in their buffer role 
between government and postsecondary institutions, the question which follows is 
to what extent these theoretical advantages are actually realized in practice. More 
specifically, in the context of Canadian higher education, how do intermediary 
bodies affect the nature of relations between universities and governments. 
In order to explore these, and related questions, a case study was designed 
which focussed upon university-government relations in two provinces, Alberta 
and British Columbia. The reasons for selecting these two western constituencies 
were quite specific and require further explanation. 
The two provinces are of comparable size, both in terms of population and in the 
structure of their postsecondary educational systems. Alberta has four public 
universities (Alberta, Calgary, Lethbridge and Athabasca) the last utilizing a 
distance education format. British Columbia supports three universities (British 
Columbia, Simon Fraser and Victoria), but also has a distance education 
institution, The Open Learning Institute, which is empowered to grant a 
baccalaureate degree. In both provinces, the expansion of the university systems 
from a single institution occurred in the same fifteen year period, 1963-1978. The 
relative imbalance in the size of the universities in each region is also similar. 
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On the other hand, the history of the agencies interposed between government 
and the universities differs significantly. As the following will describe, British 
Columbia has had an intermediary body during approximately the period, 
1974-1985, as Alberta has been without one, 1973-1985. The coincidental time 
frames provide a useful basis for assessing the role and effectiveness of the 
organizational models used in the two provinces. 
A number of other conditions are also comparable. Both governments have 
developed community colleges, distributed throughout the province, which 
feature a "university transfer" component within the curriculum. The fluctuation 
in participation rates of 18-24 year olds in higher education over the last 20 years is 
comparable. Finally, aspects of accessibility to postsecondary education, such as 
tuition fee levels and admission policies, are similar in both provincial university 
systems. 
In a sense, British Columbia became the "experimental" element of the study, 
given its experience with the Universities Council for the past eleven years. 
Conversely, Alberta played the role of "control", particularly in the light of the 
high profile assumed by the Ministry of Advanced Education, which brought 
government closer to the operation of the universities. 
Certain limitations are inherent in the design of the study. While the two 
provinces selected are comparable in many respects, neither may be assumed to be 
representative of conditions in other provinces. Nevertheless, this study may 
identify hypotheses to be tested in other provinces. 
Alberta History 
Prior to 1966, there was only one university, Alberta, with a main campus in 
Edmonton and a second campus in Calgary. However, there had been considerable 
expansion of the postsecondary educational system from 1957 to 1966: four public 
colleges were founded and two private colleges were affiliated with the 
University. 
In 1966 the University of Calgary was born and a sweeping revision of the 
Universities Act was conducted. The Alberta Universities Commission was 
established by this new legislation to take responsibility for the future development 
of the newly created system. In more specific terms, the Commission's function 
included the distribution of government grants, the supervision of program 
development and planning for the future. Despite the fact that the Deputy Minister 
of Education and the Deputy Provincial Treasurer were both ex-officio members 
of the Commission, it was regarded as an autonomous corporation, independent of 
government. The first chairman was a former Deputy Minister of Education, Dr. 
W.H. Swift. The Commission was to operate for seven years, during which 
expansion of the system included the establishment of a third university at 
Lethbridge and a proposal for a fourth institution. 
During the 1971 election campaign the opposition Progressive Conservatives 
advocated the creation of a separate Department of Advanced Education to 
coordinate the entire postsecondary sector. This department was established in 
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1972 under a Minister of Advanced Education, James Foster. In the same year, 
two separate reports concerned with the planning of the college and university 
systems recommended the total integration of the postsecondary system within the 
Ministry and the dissolution of the Universities and the Colleges Commissions. It 
was believed that such a move would lead to more efficient and effective planning, 
and would help to solve continuing problems associated with credit transfer and 
status between the universities and colleges. One report stressed that the removal 
of independent inter-bodies would ensure more accountable action by 
government. 
In 1972, the Commissions dissolved and their responsibilities transferred to the 
Department of Advanced Education in 1973. The department was to assume 
responsibility in 1975 for manpower training, apprenticeships and hospital 
training of nurses. In 1982, however, a separate Ministry of Manpower was 
created and the Advanced Education portfolio reverted to its original ministerial 
title. 
Finally, it is worth noting that, while there has been no formalized intermediary 
body in Alberta since 1972, there are several groups, variously referred to as 
Councils, Boards or Committees, which advise the Minister on specific matters. 
These bodies include the Council on Admissions and Transfer, the Students 
Finance Board, the Apprenticeship Board, and advisory committees on College 
affairs, Native Peoples Education, Technical/Vocational Education, University 
Affairs and Further Education. 
British Columbia History 
As in the case of Alberta, for most of British Columbia's existence there had been 
only one university. First admitting students in 1915, the University of British 
Columbia (UBC) moved to its present Point Grey site in 1925 and by 1948 had 
become the second largest university in the nation. 
Increased public demand for higher education encouraged the newly appointed 
President of UBC, Dr. John B. Macdonald, to prepare voluntarily a plan in 1962 
for the future development of postsecondary education in the province. 
Briefly summarized, Macdonald's proposals included: 
• the creation of two other independent degree-granting institutions 
• a sequential establishment of several two-year regional colleges, some of which 
would eventually become four-year degree granting colleges 
• the formation of an Academic Board, as an accrediting agency to advise the 
colleges on curriculum matters 
• the appointment of a University Grants Commission to advise government on 
the allocation of funding among the universities. (Macdonald, 1962) 
In 1963 a new Universities Act established the University of Victoria from an 
existing college and the brand new Simon Fraser University, as well as two 
advisory bodies: an Academic Board, to advise the Minister of Education on 
academic standards and development, and an Advisory Board to recommend on 
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the division of grants among universities. Amendments to the Public Schools Act 
provided for the establishment of regional colleges. With the opening of Simon 
Fraser University in 1965, the province's postsecondary educational system was 
radically transformed from a single university and vocational schools to a sector 
which today includes three public universities, fifteen community colleges, and 
six institutes. 
With regard to the nature of government-university relations, an Advisory 
Committee on Inter-University relations, chaired by Dr. G.N. Perry, was 
established by the Department of Education. Its report in 1969 recommended the 
replacement of the Academic and Advisory Boards with a new intermediary body 
(Perry, 1969). 
It was not until 1974, however, following a similar recommendation made by 
yet another Department of Education committee on university government, 
chaired by Dr. Walter Young, that an intermediary body called the Universities 
Council was created by statute and commenced operations in October 1974 
(Young, 1974). 
THE CONCEPT OF AN INTERMEDIARY BODY 
The theoretical arguments supporting the concept of an intermediary in higher 
education arise from the intensification of government-university relations caused 
by the latter's increasing financial dependence upon government. Simply stated, 
the use of public money constitutes the essence of government-university 
relations. This expenditure of money necessarily entails some degree of 
government control and scrutiny. The crucial question relates to the nature of that 
control. In most of the public sector the processes for government control over the 
appropriation and expenditure of tax money are well established. In the case of 
government-university relations, however, the operational nature of that control is 
less clearly defined. 
The intermediary body is one organizational mechanism by which many 
governments have sought to monitor the expenditures of public money by the 
universities while simultaneously respecting, to the extent practicable, their 
autonomy in the interests of preserving academic freedom. An international 
educator, Lord Robbins of the United Kingdom, has succinctly described the 
constitutional invention of the intermediary in this context as follows: 
If the state is willing to entrust the distribution of public money for this 
purpose and the scrutiny of the way in which it has been spent, not directly to a 
government department inevitably subject to political control and influence, 
but indirectly to a non-political expert commission or committee; and if that 
body, so far as is consistent with the execution of the larger aims of public 
policy, makes its grants in forms which impose a minimum of precise 
specification on the detail of expenditure, then there is created a partial 
insulation which should be sufficient to protect academic institutions against 
the cruder incursions of politics and to create an area in which freedom to 
maintain their own standards and initiate their own development is reasonably 
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well preserved. It can create, too, an organization in which whatever positive 
coordination and joint planning is necessary, can take place without political 
coercion. (Robbins, 1980:91) 
The powers of intermediaries variously include: collection of institutional data, 
formulation of academic master plans, approval of new programs, discontinuance 
of existing programs, review of institutional budgets and allocation of system 
operating grants. 
A large body of literature examines the effects of intermediaries and focuses 
generally on the balances between the powers of the agency and the powers of the 
institutions to control and take decisions. There are no specific guidelines resulting 
from these studies which would enable a government to establish a "proven" 
intermediary. It has been observed that: 
there have been no studies to indicate that elaborate coordination does or does 
not affect levels of state expenditure for higher education, percentage of a 
population attending college, cost of instruction or increased productivity of 
higher education. (Berdahl, 1971: 256) 
In Canada, the establishment of intermediaries occurred primarily in the 1970s 
when most provinces effected substantial changes in their legislative arrangements 
of government-university relations. The Hurtubise-Rowat Report described the 
establishment and evolving role of these provincial mechanisms thus: 
the basic problem of university-provincial relations is the role of the 
intermediary bodies ... these bodies originally came into existence to advise 
the provincial governments on the financial resources to be allocated to the 
universities and on the division of these resources among them. The situation 
has changed to such an extent that it is now the responsibility of provincial 
governments to ensure education and comprehensive planning of their future 
development.... In our view, therefore, because exclusive intervention by 
government is undesirable, intermediary bodies are needed not only to 
perform the advisory and allocative functions of the existing university 
commissions but also to assume these newer functions of coordination and 
planning. (Hurtubise-Rowat, 1970:108) 
This recommendation that intermediaries accept a planning function, reflects both 
the American conception of the role of a coordinating agency and the terms of 
reference of the prototype intermediary, the British U.G.C., which were amended 
in 1946 to include the following: 
...to assist, in consultation with the universities and other bodies concerned, 
the preparation and execution of such plans for the development of the 
universities as may from time to time be required in order to ensure that they 
are adequate to national needs. (Owen, 1980) 
Methodology 
Given the rationale advanced in support of an intermediary body in higher 
education, the next step in the study was to translate theory into practice by 
developing a procedure for gathering data regarding the actual operation of an 
1MB. This process was designed to isolate the impact of an intermediary body by 
examining current practice in the two selected provinces. 
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Based upon these same theoretical premises, it could be anticipated that an 1MB 
should influence policy in the following areas 
• Autonomy 
Does an 1MB affect the intrusion of government into the general operation of the 
universities? e.g., in the setting of tuition fees, tenure practices, admission 
requirements for students, faculty hiring policy, etc. 
• Advocacy 
Is the 1MB perceived as an advocate for the universities and/or for government? 
• Access 
Does the presence of an 1MB affect the access of university personnel to the 
Minister, with respect to influencing government policies toward the universities? 
• Budget 
Is the allocation of operating and capital budgets to the universities influenced by 
the presence of an 1MB? 
What influence does an 1MB have upon the internal institutional allocation of 
budgets? 
• Planning 
Does an 1MB affect long and short term planning policies which involve 
universities? 
It should be noted that, in considering the preceding questions, the influence of 
an 1MB must be measured against the effect of its most conventional alternative - a 
government ministry responsible for universities. Hence, in phrasing these 
questions in the two selected provinces, the Universities Council was the subject in 
British Columbia, while the Ministry of Advanced Education was the subject in 
Alberta. 
Although a certain amount of objective data was available, a good deal of the 
practical evidence consisted of the perceptions and interpretations of individuals 
involved in the ongoing relations between government and the institutions. Hence, 
two kinds of data sources were used. The first was printed materials - Council and 
Ministry reports, legislation, budget submissions and a variety of external and 
internal documents, published or not. These proved to be of less value than the 
second source - structured interviews with the key individuals in the broad range 
of government-university relations. The latter included Ministry personnel 
(Minister, Deputy Ministers, financial officers, planners), University officers 
(Presidents, Academic and Financial Vice-Presidents, planners) and members of 
the Universities Council and staff. Approximately thirty individuals from the two 
provinces were interviewed in total. 
Summary of Data 
(a) The Political Context 
In both provinces it soon became apparent that information had to be placed in a 
political context before it could be interpreted: 
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Alberta: 
Governments of recent vintage in Alberta have held overwhelming majorities, a 
privilege which has allowed them to act with confidence. In particular, the 
Lougheed administration projects a political "personality" which has a direct 
influence upon its structure and mode of operation. From the beginning, this 
government has shown great reluctance to relegate decision-making to non-
elected, apolitical bodies, such as boards or commissions. Hence, the abolition of 
the Commissions and the creation of the Ministry of Advanced Education. 
A second political characteristic of Alberta is the tendency to rotate cabinet 
positions. This phenomenon creates a further reluctance by ministers to commit 
their successors to long-term planning decisions. This latter practice, so often 
regarded as a priority task for intermediary bodies in higher education, is generally 
absent in Alberta. 
British Columbia: 
Two features are relevant to the political context of government-university 
relations with respect to the intermediary in British Columbia. First, in common 
with all IMBs, the Universities Council has no public base of authority. Being a 
creature of the legislature, it necessarily serves at the grace of the government of 
the day. The principal implication of this arrangement is that in political matters, 
the power of Council is akin to Bagehot's well known description of the role of a 
constitutional monarch, "to advise, to encourage and to warn." 
A second characteristic of the political context in B .C. is that while the 1MB was 
established by a New Democratic Party government it has, for the vast majority 
of its existence, advised a Social Credit Government and, moreover, the same 
Minister from 1975 to date. The implication is that the Council, whose 
membership is selected by the Minister, generally reflects his philosophy and 
goals. 
This conclusion was evidenced by Council's support of Ministerial initiatives in 
the expansion of the medical school at UBC, the establishment of industrial 
"parks" at all universities, and the support of a vehicle for educational television 
programming and other distance learning activities. 
(b) Governing Structure 
Alberta: 
As described earlier, the Ministry of Advanced Education (MAE), has become a 
substantial bureaucracy with a staff of approximately two hundred. Besides 
subsuming the responsibilities of the two former Commissions, it has added a 
number of additional tasks. To some observers in the university sector, there is a 
relationship between the size of the MAE and the amount of information it 
demands from the institutions. 
With respect to the composition of the MAE, several observers noted the 
absence of personnel with "strong university backgrounds," a factor which raised 
the issue of credibility. While there is no lack of confidence expressed in the 
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current staff, it was suggested that the MAE would be strengthened by the addition 
of individuals with experience and established reputations in the "unique context" 
of the university community. 
British Columbia: 
The Universities Council comprises eleven appointed laymen, including the 
chairman, who serves a maximum of two terms. Its powers are both advisory to 
government in certain areas, and regulatory with respect to such matters as new 
program approvals, and the allocation of operating grants. Generous interpretation 
of the University Act (1974) gives the Council a considerable potential power with 
respect to influencing many aspects of the universities operation. 
In 1978, a separate portfolio, the Ministry of Universities, Science and 
Technology was created and the incumbent Minister of Education was appointed 
to the portfolio. An Assistant Deputy Minister for Universities was appointed 
together with two management level civil servants, with a current total comple-
ment numbering less than six. 
The major implications of these changes are twofold. The introduction of a 
limited number of civil service positions has given Council a broader working 
relationship with the Ministry. The latter now devotes more attention to university 
affairs. The new appointments, however, have created the need to define the roles 
and relations of the respective agencies. 
Under the current legislation, no employee of the universities may be appointed 
to Council. The lack of practising academics on Council is seen to be a weakness in 
the current arrangements. 
(c) Autonomy 
Alberta: 
The Ministry has been cognizant of the need to preserve traditional university 
autonomy and this commitment is generally conceded by the individual institu-
tions. However, the term "autonomy" covers a range of precision and one Ministry 
official noted that autonomy of institutions is directly related to the degree of 
independence of their operations, financial and otherwise. In Alberta this latter 
characteristic is exemplified in the formal departmental structures for program 
approval and transferability of credit among postsecondary institutions. In the 
more traditional aspects of university autonomy, such as internal governance and 
budget allocation, Alberta's universities appear to be no less autonomous than 
those in other jurisdictions. 
British Columbia: 
The preservation of university autonomy in B.C. does not differ in principle nor 
perceptably in degree from Alberta. Program approval rests with the 1MB in B.C. 
and the normal safeguards respecting the use of the public's money are statutorily 
reserved for the universities. Indeed, the expenditure of tax dollars in the higher 
education field remains as probably the most autonomous field of public 
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expenditure in Canada. Despite that, however, the current atmosphere of 
government concern for restraint expenditure has created growing pressure for 
greater monitoring of university expenditure, hence a possible reduction in their 
autonomy, which, as Sibley noted, has never been and could never be absolute. 
(d) Access 
Alberta: 
Ease of access to the Minister of Advanced Education by university Presidents was 
acknowledged by all concerned. Furthermore, access is independent of MAE. 
While there is general agreement that the opportunity to "state the case" directly by 
individual universities is of value, there is less agreement that the advantages are 
equitable. Not surprisingly, the larger institutions wield more influence than the 
smaller and there was some suggestion that the presence of an 1MB might temper 
this advantage. 
British Columbia: 
In principle, access to the Minister by the three presidents of the universities is 
through the office of the Council. Although official communication follows that 
path, informal contact with the Minister has not been unusual in the past. 
Coincidently, the present Minister is a university professor on leave of absence, a 
factor which increases the probability of informal contact with the Presidents. 
However, as financial difficulties raise the intensity of government-university 
relations in British Columbia, the Minister tends increasingly to adopt the official 
policy of communication through the Council. This practice reinforces one of the 
anticipated roles of an 1MB. 
(e) Budget 
Alberta: 
Alberta's universities are made aware of individual budget information within 
hours of the tabling of the provincial budget. There is no delay comparable to that 
often found in other constituencies where IMBs allocate global budgets to 
individual institutions. However, the more common problems created by an 
absence of multi-year financial commitments by government are also present in 
Alberta. The annual budgets are devised through a relatively simple formula which 
incorporates a base grant, an increment related partly to inflation, and additional 
"special" grants for designated purposes, such as newly approved programs. 
Despite the formula, there is an element of unpredictability regarding budgets 
which is associated with the degree to which increments recognize both realities of 
costs and also the uncertain funding of new programs, even after their approval. 
British Columbia: 
B.C.'s universities are normally aware of their share of the annual provincial 
operating grant within a month of the tabling of the government's estimates in the 
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Legislature. For the three year period, 1979-1982, the budgets were calculated on 
the basis of an allocation formula, agreed to by the universities. For the last two 
years the Council maintained the same allocated shares in light of a disagreement 
over the basis of allocation. At no time in its history has the Council used 
discretionary power in the allocation process without the consent of the three 
universities. The issue of longer range commitments to minimal levels of funding 
had existed in B.C. prior to the establishment of the 1MB and has been advocated 
by both the 1MB and the universities. The government of the day has not responded 
to arguments on this matter. Funding is strictly an annual process - with the 1MB 
increasing the length of time of announcement of institutional allocation by no 
more than thirty days. 
( f ) Programs 
Alberta: 
The program approval process in Alberta can extend as long as three years. With 
regard to new programs and related matters, the unwillingness of the universities 
to surrender critical decisions to the MAE is reflected in the increased activity of 
the Universities Coordinating Council. This body, defined in legislation, has 
power to inquire into any matter which would be aided by cooperative action 
among the institutions. The Council's advice on program and other matters may be 
offered to the Minister or the individual General Faculties Councils. Although the 
membership of the Coordinating Council includes nine representatives from each 
university, (plus one from each affiliated private college), actions can be taken by 
executive committee. 
British Columbia: 
As is normal practice in Canadian universities, each university in B.C. has devised 
program approval procedures, primarily involving internal senates. The final 
approval to offer a degree, the definitions of which have been developed by the 
Council in consultation with the universities, resides with the 1MB. Council rarely 
disapproves a program but rather tends to refer questionable proposals to the 
proposing university for reconsideration and subsequent resubmission or with-
drawal. This program approval process adds approximately 8 months beyond the 
initial institutional approval for a program requiring funding. There is constant 
review of the program approval guidelines by the Program Coordinating 
Committee of Council which includes university representatives (Academic Vice-
Presidents). The process is perceived as one which is non-controversial and 
satisfactory to the institutions. 
(g) Planning 
Alberta: 
The issue of planning, particularly in the long term, has been discussed earlier. 
While debating the notion that an 1MB might be expected to plan independently of 
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purely political motives, one ministry official added a specific observation. He 
noted that, as universities are public institutions, funded largely through public 
funds, no planning or similar decisions can be independent of political influence. 
"Rational" decisions, based largely upon educational or financial criteria, cannot 
occur in the absence of political realities. In the planning process for universities a 
combination of both types of decision-making is necessary - and government must 
be directly involved. 
British Columbia: 
Until 1983, Council had taken no formal decision to mount a systematic planning 
exercise for the university sector in B.C. However, in that year the Council 
established a strategic planning project with a management committee containing 
representatives, inter alia, of the Council, Ministry and universities. The Minister 
had often expressed an interest in a plan to rationalize academic development and 
indicated his support for the current initiative by the Council. It is recognized by all 
those interviewed that educational, financial and political factors will all bear upon 
the planning process. The fundamental issue in the B.C. context is the movement 
by Council from an advisory role, albeit with institutional and Ministry consent, to 
a more managerial function which allocates funding in a more dirigiste manner. 
Conclusions and Commentary 
As Sibley suggested in his paper, evaluation of the effectiveness of an 
intermediary body, as opposed to direct relations between institutions and 
government, must, of necessity, become a largely subjective exercise. Although 
there are a plethora of statements, legislated enactments and commentary at varied 
levels of authority, which pertain to matters of governance, this study showed that 
a large chasm existed between the theory and the practice of university-
intermediary-government relations. Hence, the perceptions of the various constit-
uencies proved to be invaluable. 
It may well be argued that, during periods of growth in postsecondary 
education, when government funding is relatively generous, structure would be 
seen to be critical to ensuring orderly growth and institutional independence. The 
twin demands from universities in the sixties, "money and freedom", were often 
not viewed as being contradictory. The Duff-Berdahl and the Bladen Reports of 
1966 and 1965, respectively, were each conceived during a time of expansion. 
In 1984, however, the realities of financial restraint clearly influenced 
institutional views of theoretical notions of objectivity, independence and 
rationality, as applied to governance. In Alberta, the need for universities to lobby 
directly and effectively with government was regarded as critical. The suggestion 
of a buffer body was generally perceived as a potential obstacle to access. This 
view was tempered only by some observers from smaller institutions who 
hypothesized the possibility of more equitable treatment through an 1MB. 
Conversely, individuals from larger universities expressed concern that a Council 
might "homogenize" the system, which would not satisfy the needs for "special" 
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consideration arising from their institutions' size and complexity. 
In British Columbia the Council was subject to criticism from several fronts, 
again a consequence of frustrations allied to financial restraint. The universities 
questioned its advocacy role with government, expressed concern over leadership 
and criticised the equity of its allocation of the limited government grants. 
Government, on the other hand, questioned the effectiveness of Council's 
authority to "rationalize" the activity of the universities and its ability to provide 
adequate accountability for the expenditure of government monies. 
The study revealed some of the problems involved in analyzing the role of an 
intermediary body in the abstract. There is little doubt that the concept has value: it 
does hold the potential for rationality, for planning and rationalizing the university 
system independently of political motivation. Unfortunately, the political context 
is real and ever present and it is in this context, together with the related 
dimensions of financial realities that any governing structure can be measured. 
In both the provinces studied, political and fiscal environments had a major 
impact upon views of the governing structure of postsecondary education. While 
this observation is neither profound nor unexpected, it proved to have an 
overwhelming influence upon the data. 
The mandates, missions and goals of the universities in Alberta and British 
Columbia were essentially the same. All of them sought reasonable financial 
security, an opportunity to "state their case", equity and consistency of treatment, 
freedom to set priorities and to control their own development, and sensitivity to 
their problems. Whether these objectives were met through a Council or a Ministry 
seemed to be of no real consequence. 
At the same time, government officials interviewed in both provinces were 
concerned with the academic development of the university sector. They appeared 
convinced that it should be "rationalized" for the efficient use of public monies and 
to generate programs of perceived direct economic benefit to the province. 
In general, the Universities Council was perceived as having the potential to 
bring stability and rational decision-making to the system by both government and 
university officials. Conversely, in Alberta, the Ministry of Advanced Education 
was seen as having the potential to succumb to political influence if dictated. The 
common charge that IMBs simply imposed another "layer of bureaucracy", did not 
surface as an important concern. In fact, the Ministry of Advanced Education 
seemed to provide a bureaucracy surpassing that of the Council. Delays in the 
program approval process were little different in Alberta and British Columbia. 
Similarly, delay in budget allocation was perceived as originating in government, 
rather than in the Ministry of Council. In both provinces, autonomy of the 
universities, to the extent that such autonomy may be provided, was assured to the 
satisfaction of the institutions. 
Planning, particularly in the long term, was limited in both provinces by similar 
obstacles - the unwillingness of government to commit budgets beyond one year 
and the concern over restriction of freedom of action by the institution, which 
translated into scepticism with both Ministry and Council initiatives. 
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In both provinces the Minister responsible was the primary centre of concern. 
His knowledge about, and sensitivity to, academic issues, his influence with 
Treasury Board and the Cabinet, his accessibility and his method of establishing 
policy were all vital questions. Whether the Minister communicated with 
universities through a Council or his department bureaucracy was again of little 
consequence. 
The observation that nearly unanimous theoretical support existed in govern-
ment and the institutions for the arguments in favor of a buffer body was important. 
It was evidently believed that all of the values could be attained, but other realities 
demand different priorities than those of structure in governance. 
One other issue, common to British Columbia respondents, should be noted. It 
was felt strongly that the Council could work only as well as the Minister chose to 
let it work. Several examples were offered which demonstrated that the referring 
of decisions to the Council by the Minister was somewhat inconsistent. It appeared 
that the political or economic impact of a particular policy matter was a factor in 
the Minister's decision to refer. Such practices tended to erode the perception of 
the Council as a bulwark against politically motivated decision in higher education 
and hence weakened the theoretical case for an 1MB. 
Clearly, it was the "characteristics" of the decision makers which was of 
overriding concern to university respondents. Their competence, their experience, 
their powers of advocacy and their values were all qualities which concerned 
universities in their dealing with government. Further analysis is required to 
establish whether this conclusion is a product of the financial times, is of greater 
importance within the systems under study, or even is characteristic of universities 
in Canada. 
For the reasons noted above, it proved to be impossible to isolate the question of 
what advantages (or disadvantages) flow from the interposition of an intermediary 
body from a more complex set of related issues. The study did, however, reveal 
many of the practical realities of university survival in Canada in 1984. 
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